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A massive expansion of government controls over private Industry Is clearly
under way.

Government officials are playing an ever l•rger role In what tradi•

tlonally has been Internal business dec1slon•mtklng.

Yet the naw wave of govern-

ment Pegulatlon Is not merely an Intensification of existing activities; In good
measure, It Is a n.w departure.
The traditional notion of government

re~latlon

model of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

of business Is blsed on the

Under this approach, a feder•1 com-

mission is established to regulate a specific Industry, with the related concern
of promoting the well-being of that Industry.

Often the public or consumer In•

terest is subordinated, or even Ignored.
In some cases -· because of the unique expertise possessed by the members of
the Industry or Its job enticements for regulators who leave government employ•
ment ·- the regulatory commission becomes • captive of the Industry which It Is
supposed to regulate.

At the least, this Is a popularly held view of the develop-

ment of the federal regulatory process,

In addition to the ICC, other examples

of this development which have been cited from time to time Include the Civil
Aeronautics Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Power
Convnisslon.
The New Hodel of Government Regulation
Although that type of federal regulation of business surely continues, the
new regulatory efforts established by the Congress In recent years fo11ow, In the

main, a fundamentally different pattern. ·E •Iuatfng the activities ef these newer
regulatory efforts with the ICC type of model 11 Inappropriate and flAY lud to
undesirable public policy.
The new federa1 regulatory agencies are simultaneously broade,r ·f n the scope
of their jurisdiction than the tCC•CAB·FCC-FPC model.

Yet In Important a.pects

they are far more restricted. This anomoly lies at the heart of the· ptOb·l • of
relating their efforts to the national Interest.
In the cases of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Energy
Administration, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the regu•
latory agency Is not limited to a single Industry.

In the case of each of these

relative newcomers to the Federal bureaucracy, Its jurisdiction extends to the
bulk of the private sector and at times to productive activities In the public
sector Itself.

It Is this far-ranging characteristic that makes It Impractical

for any single Industry to dominate these regulatory activities In the manner of
the traditional model.
Yet In comparison to the older agencies, the newer federal regulators tn many
Important ways operate In a far narrower sphere. That ts, they are not concerned
with the totality of a company or Industry, but only with the segment of operations which falls under their jurisdiction. Thfs limitation prevents the agency
•,

from developing too close a concern with the overall well•belng of any company
or Industry.

Rather, It can result In total lack of concern over the effects of

Its specific actions on a company or Industry.
If there is any special Interest that may come to dominate such an agency,
it is the one that is preoccupied with its specific task .J environmental cleanup, elimination of job discrimination, establishment of

sa~er

working conditions,
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reduction of product hazards, and so forth.
Thus, little If any attention may be given to the basic mission of the in•
dustry to provide goods and services to the public.

Also Ignored may be cross-

cutting concerns or matters broader than the specific charter of the regulating
agency, such as productivity, economic growth, employment, cost to the consumer,
effects on overall lfvtng standards, and Inflationary impacts.

At times the pro-

cess may seem to be epitomized by that proverbial dentist who sees his patient
as merely two rows of teeth surrounded by a mass of miscellaneous material.
The result of the new approach to government regulation of business may be
the reverse of the traditional situation.

Rather than being dominated by a given

industry, the newer type of federal regulatory activity is far more likely to
utilize the resources of various Industries, or to Ignore their needs, In order
to further the specific objectives of the agency.

Hy personal study of the

activities of these new regulatory agencies reveals many negative aspects of con•
siderable Importance.
To begin with, we must recognize that it is difficult to criticize their
basic approach.

One has to possess the personality of Scrooge to quarrel with

the intent of the new wave of federal regulation -- safer working conditions,
better products for the consumer, elimination of discrimination In employment,

.·
•.

reduction of environmental pollution, and so forth.

And the programs established

to deal with these problems have at times yielded significant benefits.
But no realistic evaluation of the overall practice of government regulation
comfortably fits the notion of benign and wise officials making altogether sensi•
ble decisions In the society's greater Interests.

Instead we find waste, bias,

stupidity, concentration on trivia, conflicts among the regulators and, worst of
all, arbitrary and uncontrolled power.

These are not Idle statements;

Let me

- 4cite chapter and verse to support them.
Waste In Government Regulation
Purchasers of new cars produced In the United States In 1974 paid over $3
billion extra for the equipment and modifications needed to meet federal require•
ments.

Mandatory auto buzzers and harnesses (the widely detested "Interlock"

system) will rapidly fade Into history due to recent congressional action, but
not until after more than 40 percent of the owners of those expensive and annoyIng contraptions disconnected them or otherwise found ways of avoiding their use.
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of government adding to the costs of private produc•
tion Is continuing.
The agencies carrying out federal regulation are proliferating.

In the past

decade alone, we have seen the formation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Energy Administration,
the Cost Accounting Standards Board, the National Bureau of Fire Prevention, the
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, to cite
the better known ones.
The administrative cost of thfs army of enforcers (approximately $2 billion
a year to support a regulatory workforce in excess of 63,000) represents but the
~ip

of the Iceberg.

It Is the costs Imposed on the private sector that are

really huge, the added expenses of business firms which must comply with govern•
ment directives, and which inevitably have to pass on these costs to thefr customers.

A dlreet cost of government controls fs the growing

Imposed on business firms:

pape~ork

burden

the expensive and time-consuming process of submit•

ting reports, making applications, fl111ng out questionnaires, replying to orders
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and

directiv~s,

and appealing in the courts from some of the regulatory rulings.

There now •re 5,146 different types of e1pproved government forms.

Individuals

and business firms spend over 130 million man-hours a year filling them out.
There is

~

they regulate.

great lack of understanding on the part of regulators of those
This is vividly conveyed in a conversatior. reported by a small

manufacturer who attended a federal meeting on the paperwork burden.

When he

was advised not to worry about the matter personally but have his staff complete
the forms, he replied, "When I attend this meeting the st2ff is right here with
me • . I t 1 s me • ' '
A small, 5000 watt radio station tn New Hampshire reported that It spent
over $26 just to mail to the Federal Communications Commission Its application
for renewing its license-- and that was before the last rate Increase.

An

Oregon company, operating three small televisions stations, reported that its
license renewal application weighed 45 pounds.

At the other end of the spectrum,

one large corporation, with about 40,000 employees, uses 125 files drawers of
back-up
area.

m~teri3l

just to meet the federal reporting requirements In the personnel

The personnel manager contends that one-third of his staff could be elimi-

nated if there were no government reporting requirements.
Another hidden cost of federal regulation is a reduced rate of technological
innovation.

The longer that it takes for some change to be

~pproved

by a federal

regulatory agency -- a new product or a more efficient production process
less likely that the change will be made.

the

Professor William Wardell of the

University of Rochester Medical School has shown thet as a resuit of the more
liberal policy in the United Kingdom toward the introduction of new drugs,
Britain has

experlen~ed

cleor1y discernible gains by introducing useful new drugs,

either sooner than the United States or exclusively.

Professor Sam Peltzman of

- 6the University of Chicago estimates that the 1962 amendments to the Food and Drug
Act are delaying the Introduction of effective drugs by about four years.
The private costs of government regulation arise tn good measure from the
attitudes of the regulators.

To quote a member of the Consumer Product Safety

Commission, "When ft Involves a product that is unsafe, I don't care how much it
costs the company to correct the problem." Nobody can fault the ConvnJsslon for
not putting Its money (and the public's) where Its big mouth fs.

In one recent

case where an offending company had not posted a label on Its product bearing
the correct offlclalese (••cannot be made non poisonous"), it was forced to destroy the contents.

With little concern about costs, the commission apparently

dfd not think about such economical solutions as pasting a new label on the can.
An expected result of the lack of attention to the costs of regulation is
the opportunity for bureaucrats to engage In all sorts of exercises in trivia
and on occasion sheer nonsense.
Consider the plight of the small businessman who tries to deal with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rules without paying for
expensive outside assistance.
face:

These are the kinds of questions that he must

What size to establish for toilet partitions?

pends where It Is).
of a building?

When is a roof a floor?

How big Is a hole? (it de-

What colors to paint various parts

How feequentty are spittoons to be cleaned? The public's taxes

actually support people who are willing to establish and administer regulations
dealing with these burning issues.
Let us start with a supposedly simple matter, the definition of an exit.
The dictionary tells us that exit is "a passage or way out. 11

For OSHA enforcers,

defining exit is a challenge to their bureaucratic instincts and they are not
found wanting.

To OSHA, an exit is

11

that portion of a

meaG$

of egress which is

- 7 separated from all other spaces of the building or structure by construction or
equipment as required in this subpart to provide a protected way of travel to
the exit discharge."
Obviously, you have to find out what is "a means of egress 11 as well as an
exlt discharge."

11

Exit discharge Is defined merely as "that portion of a means

of egress between the termination of an exit and a public way. 11 But OSHA defines

11

a means of egress" as ... continuous and unobstructed way of exit travel

from any point In a building or structure to a public way and consists of three
separate and distinct parts:
exit discharge.

the way of exit access, the exit, and the way of

A means of egress comprises the vertical and horizontal ways

of travel and shall include intervening room spaces, doorways, hallways, corridors,
passageways, balconies, ramps, stairs, enclosures, exits, escalators, horizontal
exits, courts, and yards."
Unlike the dictionary, OSHA Is unable to provide a definition of exit which
does not contain the word exit in lt.

And exit is a comparatively easy one.

Try ladder, where the reader literally has to cope with three renditions of the
same tedious set of definitions plus one trigonometric function.

The puzzlement

over OSHA regulations extends to the chairman of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, the independent agency created to hear appeals from
rulings by OSHA Inspectors.

After citing one vague standard, he lamented:

"What do you think it tells us to do?
11

1 have no idea --and I don•t think OSHA could tell you
either, before an inspection, citation, complaint, hearing
and post-hearing brief.
1 submit that there Isn't a person on earth who can be
certain he is in full compliance with the requirements of
this standard at any particular point of time.''

11

- 8The operation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act provides a pertinent
example of how government regulation can lose sight of the basic objective.

A

company, particularly a smaller one without its own specialized safety personnel,
which invites OSHA to come to the plant to tell the management which practices
need to be revised to meet the agency's standards instantly lays itself open to
citations for infractions of the OSHA rules and regulations.

The law makes no

provision for so-ca11ed courtesy inspections.
In order to get around the problem,one regional office of OSHA has come up
with a beautifully bureaucratic solution.

They suggest that companies take

photographs of their premises and send them to OSHA for off-site review.
all, if the Inspectors do not actually

11

After

see 11 the violations, they cannot issue

citations for them!
OSHA does not have a· monopoly position in the realm of regulatory foolishness.

An examination of the proposed Uniform Guidelines on Employee Seteetion

Procedures is revealing.

The Guidelines were drafted by the U.S. Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Coordinating Council to assure that the procedures, in both the
public and the private sectors, do not discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.

The objective surely is worthy.

Vet the

specific guidelines which the Council has developed have been challenged by such
professional organizations as the American Society for Personnel Administration
and the American Psychological Association.
A mere reading of the proposed regulations reveals the basis for the concern.
Smaller employers would have great difficulty in just understanding the regulations, while large and small companies alike would find It extremely
and expensive to comply.

diffi~ult

Even when the Coordinating Council tries to ease the

burden on employers, the result challenges the understanding of the business

- 9 executive:
procedure has criterion-related validity, for
the purpose of these guidelines, when the relationship be~
~een performance on the procedure and performance on at
least one relevant criterion measure is statistically
significant at the .OS level of significance ••• lf therelationship between a selection procedure and a criterion
measure is significant but nonlinear, the score distribu•
tion should be studied to determine if there are sections
of the regression curve with zero or near zero slope where
scores do not reliably predict different levels of job
performance.''
·~selection

Should these guidelines be enforced, the result Is not likely to be fairer
testing but a shift from what would become more costly and cumbersome procedures
back to the simpler but far more bias-prone subjective oral Interview.
The image of the all-wise and judicious government administration of con•
trols Is severely tested in practice.

The responsibility for doing the basic

research underlying new job safety and health regulations has been assigned to
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

In early 1974, NIOSH signed an agreement

with the Amalgamated Clothing \·/orkers Onion under which an official federal study

ot safety and health hazards In the clothing industry is conducted by a union em•
ployee and paid for by the union.

In reporting this strange arrangement, OSHA

noted that the union will help obtain the cooperation of plant managers.
painful to contemplate the reaction of

~anagement

It is

to an Investigation of fts

premises by its union In behalf of the government!
The double standard at times followed by federal regulators can be another
cause for concern over the extent of the power entrusted to them.

The Environ-

mental Protection Agency is now studying the possible polluting which wfll be
caused by the catalytic converters it has mandated for future automobiles.
Government researchers have shown that the new "anti-po11ution 11 equipment may

-
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produce harmful amounts of sulphuric acid mists, which can irritate the lungs.
Just think of the government and public outrage which would have resulted if a
private business firm had taken such action prior to submitting a detailed
environmental impact statement.
Conflicts Among Regulations
It is perhaps Inevitable, but the proliferation of government controls has
Jed to conflicts among controls and controllers.

In some cases, the rules of a

given agency work at cross purposes with each other.
alarms on vehicles. at construction sites.

OSHA mandates back-up

Vet simultaneously the agency requires

employees to wear earplugs, to protect them against noise, that can make it
extremely difficult to hear the alarms.

More serious and more frequent are the

contradictions between the rulings of two or more government agencies where the
regulated have little recourse.
The simple task of washing children's pajamas in New York State exemplifies
how two sets of laws can pit one worthy objective against another, in this case
ecology versus safety.

Because of a ban on phosphates in detergents, the mother

who launders her child's sleepwear In an ecologically sound way may risk washing
away its required fire-rP.sistant properties.
In 1973, New York State banned the sale of detergents
in an effort to halt water pollution.

containin~

phosphatP.s,

Less than two months later, a federal

regulation took effect requiring children's sleepwear to be flame-retardant.

New

York housewives now face a dilemma, because phosphates are the strongest protector of fire-retardanci.

They hold soil and minerals in solution, preventing the

formation of a mask on the fabric that would inactivate flame-reslstancy.

What

does a conscientious mother do in a phosphate-banned area to avoid dressing her
child in nightclothes that could burn up.

Smuggle in the forbidden detergent?
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Commit an Illegal act of laundry?
The controversy over restrooms furnishes another example of the conftfct

..

among different regulations.

It also

demon~t~ates

that common

supply In the administration of government controls.

sen~ ~

ln short

The Labor Department, in

carrying out its weighty responsibilities under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, has provided industry with detailed instructions concerning the size,
shape, dimensions, and number of toilet seats.

For well-known biological reasons,

it also requires some type of lounge area to be adjacent to women•s restrooms.
However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has entered this vital
area of government-business relations.

The Commission requires that male toilet

and lounge facilities, although separate, must be equal to those provided to
women.

Hence, either equivalent lounges must be built adjacent to the men's

toilets or the women's lounges must be dismantled, OSHA and state laws to the
contrary notwithstanding.

To those who may insist that nature did not create

men and women with exactly identical physical characteristics and needs, we can
only reply that regulation, like justice, must be blind.
Uncontrolled Power of Government Regulators
The instances of waste and foolishness on the part of government regulators
pale into insignificance when compared to the arbitrary power that they can
exert.

To cite a member of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, "any time

that consumer safety is threatened, we're going to go for the company's throat. 11
That this statement is not merely an overblown metaphor can be seen by examining
the case of Marlin Toy Products of Horicon, Wisconsin.
I

I
I
I

i

The firm's two main products, Flutter Ball and Birdie Ball, were plastic
toys for children, identica1 except that one contained a butterfly and the other

- 12 a bird.

The toys originally held plastic pellets that rattled.

This led the

Food and Drug Administration in 1972 to place the products on its ban list because it was worried that, if the toys cracked, the pellets could be swallowed
by a child.

The company recalled the toys and redesigned its product line to

eliminate the pellets and thus be removed from the ban list.
The newly-formed Consumer Product Safety Commission in 1973 assumed responsibility in this area.

Because of an

11

edltorial error," it put the Marlin pro-

ducts on its new ban list, although there was no longer any reason to ban them.
Apparently the Commission incorporated an out-of-date FDA list.

The error was

called to the Commission•s attention, but it replied that it was not about to
reca 11 250,000 11 s ts

11

j us t to take one or two toys off • 11

Marlin Toy Products was forced out of the toy business and had to lay off

75 percent of its employees due to the federal error.

It is ironic to note that

the Commission specializes in ordering companies to recall their products if any
defective ones have been produced, but refuses to recall Its own product when
there Is a defect In every single one.
A more humorous instance of the CPSC 1 s failure to abide by its own standards
involves the toy safety buttons which it intended to distribute in the Fall of
1974 in an effort to make consumers more safety conscious.

Only after producing

80,000 buttons did the Commission learn that its product was dangerous to children,
pecause of the lead paint and the possibility of breaking off and swallowing
pieces of the button.

Unlike the procedures that it expects of the companies it

regulates, the Commission presumably ran its tests after rather than before pro•
duction.

Fortunately, it realized its error prior to making public distribution

of the buttons.

Hence, ••only•• wastes of resources and tax dollars were Involved.
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Conclusion
This is not a general attack on all forms of government regulation.

..

A

society, acting through government, can and should act to protect consumers
against rapacious sellers, individual workers against unscrupulous employers, and
future generations against those who would waste the nation's resources.

Thus,

controls to avoid infant crib deaths can be advocated without supporting a
plethora of detailed federal rules and regulations dealing with the color of exit
lights and the maintenance of cuspidors.
Because of the very substantial costs and other adverse side-effects that
they give rise to, society should take a new and hard look at the existing array
of government controls over business.

A substantial effort should be made to

eliminate those controls that generate excessive costs.

Rather than blithely

continuing to proliferate government controls over business, alternative means
of achieving Important national objectives should be explored and developed,
solutions that expand rather than reduce the role of the market.
A good beginning might be based on the environmental regulations themselves.
In general, the society is supposed to examine the impact on the environment of
the various actions that It takes.

Would it not also be appropriate to require

each environmental agency to assess the impacts of its action on the society as
a whole and particularly on the economy?
'·

portant national objective.

Surely a cleaner environment is an im-

But it is not the only national objective, and cer-

tainly society has no stake In selecting the most expensive and most disruptive
ways of achieving Its environmental goals.
Unpopular as It may be, I urge the same balanced attitude for the other new
regulatory programs, Including product safety, job health, equal employment,
energy, et al.

In a sense, I am proposing that public policy take the best from
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both the old and the new models of government

reg~lation

of business.

As in most

things in life, the sensib1e questions are not matters of either/or, but rather

..

of more or less and how.

In this way, business can both help to achieve closer

attainment of the nation's social goals while it achieves the basic economic
function of more efficient production and distribution of goods and services •

..

